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Abstract:  Do increased levels of female land inheritance lead to increases in female intrahousehold
bargaining  power?  Analysis  of  an  expansive  Rwandan  household  survey  dataset  from  2010-2011
suggests that female land inheritances are positively associated with female intrahousehold bargaining
power. The results support the relative efficacy of intrahousehold bargaining models over that of unitary
household  models.  The findings  have  implications for  Rwandan lawmakers debating changes to  the
country's “Succession law” which makes gender discrimination in land inheritance illegal. This is the first
paper of its kind to estimate female land inheritance's effect on bargaining power in Rwanda. 
The author wishes to thank Dr. Elizabeth Katz, Dr. Jesse Anttila-Hughes, Dr. Bruce Wydick, Anna Knox, the staff of
Chemonix and the USAID LAND Project  in Rwanda,  the National University of  Rwanda Faculty of  Law and
Department of Biology,  Erasme Uyizeye, Pierre Kolowe, Jim Anderson, Beth Kaplin, Susan and Michael Adebayo,
April Armstrong, and all of the other MSIDEC professors and colleagues who have helped make this paper possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much literature written on the effects of income distribution on household
expenditures. It has been largely established that households do not maximize one joint utility
function, but household expenditures are determined through a bargaining process between the
household members, particularly the male and female head(s) of household. Through analysis of
an  expansive  dataset  from  Rwanda,  this  paper  seeks  to  determine  whether  female  land
inheritance has significant impacts on the intrahousehold bargaining power of women.
This topic of research can have implications for policymakers in areas where land is a
major source of wealth, and inheritance is a major channel through which land is acquired, such
as in Rwanda. In all developing countries, women own significantly less land than men, even
though they make up about half, and sometimes more than half of the population (Deere, C. D.,
& Doss, C. R., 2006). The large discrepancies between male and female land ownership present
equity, efficiency, and economic concerns. It has been shown that traditional resistance to female
land  ownership  can  decrease  production  output  by diverting  land  and  resources  away from
female plots of land which would have relatively higher returns to investment, onto male plots
(Rodgers & Menon, 2012).  This resistance to female land ownership based on the idea that
women are less skilled farmers than men has been shown to be false (Rodgers & Menon, 2012).
More equitable land allocation could have positive impacts on food production, female nutrition,
children's nutrition, and poverty levels in developing countries (Rodgers & Menon, 2012). This
analysis is the first of its kind done in Rwanda, and adds to a relatively small area of literature
which analyzes the effects specifically of inherited land on bargaining power.
With the use of the EICV3 household living conditions dataset, which collected a wide
range of information on almost 15,000 randomly-selected Rwandan households from 2010-2011,
it is possible to reproduce the analysis of Hoddinot and Haddad (1991), with slight adaptation to
the current specific research question. 
OLS and tobit models are used in this analysis in an attempt to estimate the causal effect
of increases in the ratio of female-inherited to total household land, on the budget shares spent on
various goods which, according to the literature, are generally preferred by female parents. The
analysis  finds  that  increasing  shares  of  household  land  that  is  female  inherited  land  are
conditionally correlated with increases in the proportion of household budget shares devoted to
female goods, and negatively correlated with budget shares devoted to male goods. The findings
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also suggest that this is not due to substitution of female goods for other goods, but evidence of
an increase in female bargaining power brought about by asset ownership. 
Section two of the paper is a review of relevant literature covering the background of
female land inheritance in Rwanda, theoretical household bargaining models, and examples of
similar empirical analyses of female intrahousehold bargaining power. Section three covers the
dataset and methodology used in analyzing the data. Section four contains descriptive statistics,
regression results, and discussion of the results. Section five consists of conclusions and policy
recommendations.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In many rural areas of the developing world, land ownership can be a large determinant
of whether or not someone lives in poverty. Land scarcity has, at multiple points in Rwanda's
history, contributed to violent conflicts within the country, leading to large forced out-migrations
followed  by  repatriations  of  Rwandans.  In  fact,  tensions  over  increasingly  inequitable  land
distribution are believed to have contributed substantially to the genocide of 1994 (André, 1997).
The inequitable distribution of land creates particularly acute problems for women, who have not
generally been given the same traditional, or official legal protections of land ownership as men.
After the 1994 conflict, Rwanda's remaining population was 70% female due to the large
loss of life and imprisonment of men (Powley, 2006). These many new heads of households
were, by Rwandan law and custom, not generally in line to inherit land from their deceased
fathers and brothers. 
The gender-equitable distribution of land is highly important in shaping the future of
Rwanda. The country has the highest population density in Africa; a relatively large percentage
of Rwandan households are headed by women as a result of Rwanda's tumultuous history; and
over 90% of the population relies on agriculture for income and subsistence (Kairaba, A., &
Simons, J. D.).
The appeal of land ownership is large, as land is a productive compliment to rural labor,
which  is  often  the  most  significant  input  that  many poor  rural  households  can  put  towards
production. Land can provide income, and titled land is often needed to gain access to credit
markets (Binswanger, 1986). 
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It has been shown that official land titling, and its associated property rights protections,
can increase land values and investment in land. It can also increase economic activity/prosperity
for landowners and others in areas near titled land. Traditionally,  Rwandan women have not
often owned land, as they were expected to be associated with, and reap the benefits of, the land
of either their fathers- or once they were married- the land of their husbands (Burnet, 2001). 
Insecure and/or informal ownership of land can induce less-than-optimal investments in
land,  and lead  to  sub-optimal  amounts  of  labor  and other  inputs  being used for  agricultural
cultivation. Holding proper title to land creates increased incentives to not only produce optimal
amounts of agricultural products from land in the short run, but it also can help to ensure that
sustainable agricultural practices are employed in order to ensure long term viability of land
(Heltburg, 2002). 
Under  customary Rwandan law,  with small  regional  variations,  land has  traditionally
almost always been passed on from fathers to sons. Women are often given usage rights to their
fathers' land, a right which is usually rescinded when she marries or when the land is needed for
other purposes. The main means by which women have access to land are through marriage,
through  small  or  symbolic  gifts  of  land  from  family  members,  or  through  their  father's
landholdings. Land that is gifted to women by family is sometimes done so with the knowledge
that she will not have significant decision-making power over the asset. They would not be able
to decide to gift,  sell,  rent,  or build upon the land without the consent of a male,  usually a
women's father, brother, or husband (Lankhorst and Veldman, 2011).
In order to rectify part of the problem of millions of women not having property rights to
the land which is so important to their well-being, the government altered Rwandan legal code to
ban the inequitable distribution of land between males and females in land succession. This law,
The  Law  on  Matrimonial  Regimes  and  Inheritance  of  1999,  has  become  known  as  the
“Succession” or  “Inheritance” law.  The law gives  daughters  equal  inheritance rights  to their
parents' land, gives wives equal rights to common matrimonial property, and gives the widows of
deceased men the right to inherit their property.
The Succession law was promulgated in 1999, and so became legally binding on all land
inheritances in Rwanda since then. Even so, traditional negative views of female ownership of
land has undermined the progress that the law was designed to foster. Many women who attempt
to assert their rights over land are met with resistance by family members and communities, lack
of  support  from government  bodies  and  courts,  and  corruption  in  legal  processes.  In  rural
Rwanda, women often have very limited access to formal judicial institutions.  According to an
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RCN Justice & Démocratie study, about 1 in 40 land disputes which started at the village level
went to a formal court, and about 48% of formal cases were dismissed (Veldman and Lankhorst,
2011).  For  these reasons,  many women do not  attempt to  assert  their  legal  rights  over  land
(RWN, 2011), and the traditional practice of passing land down to only male children is still
common.
The Succession law was passed for ethical concerns about the inability of most women to
inherit land. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of potential economic and female bargaining
power benefits which could come from female land inheritance. 
Many studies have shown that female empowerment and increases in income, through
vectors such as ownership of land, helps to increase female health and education, as well as
increasing their children's health and education outcomes (Hoddinot & Haddad, 1991). Increases
in childhood health  and education are positively correlated with lifetime earnings and social
mobility (Gosh, 2007). The human capital accumulation associated with improved health and
education have been shown to be important in the development of low performing economies
(Strauss, 1998).
Increases in female intrahousehold bargaining power can provide an explanation for the
channel through which increases in female wealth leads to improvements in child health and
education outcomes. It has been shown that increased household income shares controlled by
females  contributes  to  increases  in  household  budget  shares  spent  on  household  goods,  and
children's education, and decreases in household budget shares spent on children's clothing. It is
also associated with decreases in income shares spent on alcohol and cigarettes, goods which are
know to cause health problems and negative externalities (Hoddinot & Haddad, 1991, 1995).  
Positive impacts on children's health or educational outcomes due to increased female
intrahousehold bargaining power, as a result of increased levels of female land inheritance, could
provide legislative justification for strengthening the Succession law, or enacting further laws
which attempt to increase levels of female land inheritance.
Not  all  evidence  points  to  increases  in  female  income  and  asset  ownership  having
positive impacts on things which are important for development. Doepke & Tertilt (2011) find
that, depending on the context, female empowerment can actually hinder economic development.
The authors developed models of non-cooperative spousal decision-making to model the effects
of policy interventions on the intra-household allocation of household public goods. Through
their analysis, they found that income transfers targeted at women may not help children more
than if they had been targeted at men, due to the substitution of goods like food, for other goods
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like shelter. They also examined the implications for female empowerment in terms of female
access  to  negative  goods  such  as  alcohol,  tobacco,  drinking  at  bars,  etc.,  which  are  often
restricted for sale to men. When these restrictions are lifted through female empowerment, and
women are allowed more access to “vices”, this can have significant negative impacts on child
outcomes. 
The authors argue that even if female-targeted transfers increase investment in children,
this investment could take the form of mothers investing in a higher number of children, rather
than investing more in each child. If fertility rates increase at greater rates than investment per
child, then these transfers could have negative consequences for children, and general economic
development. 
2.1 Divorce Threat Model
In  a  number  of  popular  models  of  intrahousehold  resource  allocation,  marriage  is  a
central theme and channel through which outcomes are manifested. In two early 1980s papers,
Manser & Brown (1980) and McElroy & Horney (1981) look at marriage as a cooperative game
which  is  solved  through  Nash-style  bargaining  when  spouses  have  differences  of  opinions,
specifically concerning resource allocation. These models do a better job of modeling reality
than unitary household models  do,  in that  they not  only take into account  the family's  total
resources, and the set of outcomes available to them, but the models also explicitly incorporate
the amounts of resources controlled by different family members, particularly the husband and
wife. The distribution of resources (income, land, etc.) between the husband and wife pair can
have significant  impacts  on family outcomes (Manser  & Brown,  1980,  McElroy & Horney,
1981).
Manser  and Brown develop a  number  of  new models  of  household  decision  making
which  explicitly  include  differences  in  the  utility  functions  of  different  members  of  the
household.  They included the idea that some goods, such as childcare or housing are things
which the entire family derives benefits from. In their models, the decision to marry is very much
influenced by the fact that these “household goods” are available to married couples, but not
single individuals. (Manser & Brown, 1980).
Within the models, married couples or couples considering getting married pool their
income as in previous models, however the couple doesn't maximize a single household utility
function. They agree on a bargaining rule which will be used to decide how best to use the
household's resources. In these bargaining models, it is assumed that each party knows the true
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preferences of both parties, as the two parties are likely to know one another well. The authors
require that their models meet three criteria. The model must yield pareto optimal outcomes, the
bargaining outcomes must be independent to the labels of each party (husband, wife, etc.), and
any outcomes reached have to be unchanged by linear, affine transformations of the two parties'
utility functions.
Through  these  assumptions,  and  examination  of  a  number  of  household  bargaining
models,  the authors arrive at  the conclusion that  if,  given a  positive exogenous shock to an
individual, (perhaps a raise in income or inheritance of land) that individual's “threat point” will
be moved. Their threat of divorce is stronger and more credible because, given a divorce, they
would be better off than they would have been before the shock. That individual having a better
outside option in the event of a divorce allows them to exert  relatively more influence over
household decisions (Manser & Brown, 1980).
In a subsequent paper, McElroy and Horney examined implications specifically for the
Nash bargaining household model. Instead of looking at the demand for marriage with multiple
models,  the authors  analyzed empirical  implications  of  the  Nash bargaining framework,  and
tested the hypothesis that the bargaining model would yield the same results as the “neoclassical”
unitary household model (McElroy & Horney, 1981).
The authors assume, as others before them, that each household consists of a husband and
wife pair who make all of the household decisions. In the neoclassical model, one would assume
that the household pools income and maximizes their family utility function, but in the Nash
model,  each individual  has their  own utility function,  and household resources  are  allocated
based on bargaining within the household. 
In a number of cases, the authors find that the Nash model yields the same comparative
statics as the neoclassical model, given certain assumptions about threat points and their level of
dependence on prices and the nonwage incomes of the individuals. However, in a previous paper,
the  authors  found  empirical  evidence  that  the  results  of  a  Nash  bargaining  system  do  not
converge to those of the neoclassical one. They take this to mean that there is much to be gained
by looking at the workings of households through the Nash bargaining lens, since it seems to
explain  more  of  what  goes  on  in  real  households,  and in  finer  detail.  This  new bargaining
framework has many empirical uses, as it can be used to examine implications of exogenous
changes in taxes and transfers which change the nonwage income of, and prices faced by, each
spouse in a marriage (McElroy & Horney, 1981).
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Each individual's control of resources is important in the previously mentioned models,
because the bargaining in the games depends on the strength of each individual's "threat points".
The better the divorced option for an individual, the stronger that individual's threat points within
the  marriage,  and  the  more  of  the  individual's  preferences  will  be  reflected  in  the  eventual
bargaining outcome of the family. 
While divorce is one way that a marriage between two disagreeing spouses can go, it is
not the only way. Some marriages could end up in non-cooperative equilibria, still remaining as
in-tact marriages.
2.2 Separate Spheres Model
An adaptation of the Divorce Threat intrahousehold bargaining theory comes from a 1993
paper by Lundberg and Pollak. The authors compare the ideas of two cash transfer schemes
aimed at helping two-parent families with children. In one program the cash would be given to
the mother in the family, and in the other scheme, cash would be given to the father. Based on
Becker's  Altruism model  of  intrahousehold  resource  allocation,  both  programs  should  have
exactly the same effect, since the households would be assumed to be maximizing the same
single utility function no matter who receives the cash transfer (Becker, 1981).
They developed a "separate spheres" bargaining model as opposed to the "divorce threat
model" of husband and wife households. The threat point of this model is not the dissolution of
the marriage through divorce, but a non cooperative marriage equilibrium. This non cooperative
equilibrium may end up as the final equilibrium due to transaction costs of transferring wealth
within the household (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). 
In a non cooperative equilibrium, family public goods, goods that can be consumed by
everyone  in  the  family,  are  under-supplied  and  the  family  could  realize  welfare  gains  by
engaging in cooperation. This cooperation can often look like the specialization of each member
of the household in certain responsibilities. Often, traditional gender roles serve as a way to more
efficiently divide labor.  If  each member of  the household is  responsible  for providing some
amount  of  every  family  public  good,  such  as  family  income,  or  childcare,  the  lack  of
specialization can lower the overall provision of these goods.
The “separate-spheres” equilibrium is one in which the husband and wife are each wholly
responsible for providing a different set of household goods. In non cooperative marriages, this
division  of  labor  is  reached  through  social  expectations  of  gender  roles.  The  cooperative
bargaining equilibrium is the case where the two individuals can make binding and enforceable
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agreements  within  marriage,  regarding  the  division  of  labor.  The  creation,  negotiation,  and
enforcement of such agreements can have transaction costs. These costs are avoided when the
non cooperative equilibrium is  reached,  and the equilibrium is  stabilized by social  norms of
gender  roles.  This  non cooperative  equilibrium is  the  starting  point  from which  threat-point
bargaining can take place (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). 
This  model,  while  using  some  of  the  same  nomenclature  as  divorce  threat  models,
reaches different conclusions. In the separate spheres model, the amount of resources controlled
by each party does not have an effect on the equilibrium level of family public goods provided,
or equilibrium utility levels of the contributors to those goods. These properties hold for all
solutions except corner solutions, where one member of the husband-wife pair contributes zero
to the provision of a household good. 
In the divorce threat model,  the main threat point is divorce,  whereas in the separate
spheres model,  divorce is  assumed to be prohibitively costly,  or impossible,  so that  the non
cooperative equilibrium is the main threat point (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993).
In  the  version  of  the  model  which  includes  binding  and  enforceable  prenuptial
agreements on intrahousehold transfer levels, each child allowance scheme (one in which the
mother is paid, and another in which the father is paid) will have an indistinguishable effect, as
long as the family is not at a corner solution. If the mother is the only individual providing the
public good “child care”, then which child allowance scheme is used has a large effect on her
threat point. In this model, the husband is the only income generator, and essentially “purchases”
childcare services from the wife via income transfers to her. 
The authors find that in the long run, any redistribution effects of child allowances can be
undone in the marriage market, if binding and costlessly-enforceable prenuptial agreements can
be  made  by  prospective  marriage  couples.  In  a  marriage  market  without  these  prenuptial
agreements, changing from a child allowance scheme that gives fathers money to one which
gives mothers money can have significant effects on the number of marriages which happen,
taking into account the relevant number of men and women who wish to marry (Lundberg &
Pollak, 1993). 
2.3 Empirical Studies
While  theories  of  intrahousehold  resource  allocation  have  been  around  for  decades,
rigorous empirical testing of those theories, particularly in developing contexts, is a relatively
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recent phenomenon. There is research being done on what the implications of individual levels of
resource control are on family spending habits. 
A number  of  authors  have  explored  the  effects  of  income distribution  on  household
expenditure on goods.  They generally find that an increased share of income attributed to a
female head of household (wife, mother, etc.) causes increases in spending on household public
goods, children's primary and secondary education, and food (Duflo & Udry, 2004, Hodinot &
Haddad, 1991, Quisumbing & de La Brière, 2000). 
A more “female-centric” bundle of goods could be arrived at through the household's
bargaining process due to an increased level of female bargaining power attributed to her having
a higher share of the household's landholdings. There is evidence to support this idea in Mason
(1998) in which the author finds that females in India and Thailand have increased decision-
making power when they own land (Mason, 1998).
The advent of the bargaining power model as an alternative to the unitary household
model has been a significant advance in the field of intrahousehold bargaining, and helped to
explain the patterns of behavior which are observed by families all over the developing world.
The efficacy of the bargaining model has been supported in related literature. In particular, a
2003 paper by Quisumbing and Maluccio uses various data sets  from Bangladesh,  Ethiopia,
Indonesia, and South Africa to test the relative predictive power of the unitary and bargaining
household models. The authors find that the unitary model is not a valid predictor of household
expenditures.
While the authors were not able to conclude that any particular bargaining model was the
best  predictor  of  empirical  behavior,  they were  able  to  find evidence that  different  resource
allocations as well as both human and non-human capital accumulated by husbands and wives
did have effects on the amount of resources devoted by a family to different goods, such as
female child education. There were conflicting results in different contexts regarding the effects
of increased mother's or father's assets on female education. This result suggests that there is
indeed bargaining going on between husbands and wives which results in decisions about family
expenditures, and that this process is affected by measurable individual attributes, such as level
of education, income, etc. (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003).
Author  Keera  Allendorf,  in  a  2007  paper,  writes  about  the  effects  of  female  land
ownership on household decision making and early life outcomes for children. Using 2001 DHS
data from Nepal, the author finds that young children of women who own land are significantly
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less likely to be underweight due to negative nutrition outcomes, and women who own land are
significantly more likely to have household decision-making authority (Allendorf, 2007).
The  author  uses  an  intrahousehold  bargaining  framework  to  examine  differences  in
intrahousehold bargaining power, as revealed by answers to DHS questions about who in the
household has final decision power over 4 particular  important  household decisions.  Once a
measure  of  bargaining  power  is  attained,  that  data  is  compared  to  child  health  outcomes,
particularly children's  weight-for-age,  as  this  is  a  good indicator  of  young child health.  The
theory suggests that women have higher preferences than men for child-related goods, and are
more  likely to  bargain for  household resource  allocation  in  favor  of  children's  nutrition and
health. This hypothesis is supported by the outcomes of the author's analysis (Allendorf, 2007).
The authors find that 70% of women who own land make at least one of four major
household decisions alone or jointly,  compared with 48% of women in households in which
someone else owns land, and 60% of women in households which don't own land. Women who
own land themselves are more likely than their landless counterparts to be the sole decider on at
least one of the four decisions.
 The author also finds that only 8% of children of land-owning mothers are underweight,
as opposed to 14% of children of mothers who don't own land. Regression analysis of children
being underweight against female empowerment suggest that children are about 50% less likely
to be underweight if their mother is a landowner. These results, and the theoretical framework
used to arrive at them are further evidence of the utility of non-unitary intrahousehold bargaining
models.
While female land ownership is a relatively well-studied topic, there have not been many
studies of female inheritance and its effects on female bargaining power. There has yet to be a
published  study  which  specifically  examines  female  land  inheritance's  effect  on  bargaining
power  in  Rwanda.  In  areas  of  the  world  where  inheritance  is  the  main  method  of  land
acquisition, land inheritance patterns may be more explanatory than land ownership patterns in
general. This paper seeks to fill that gap in the literature specifically in the Rwandan context.  
III. METHODOLOGY
The data used in this paper are taken from the Rwandan EICV3 (Enquête Intégrale sur les
Conditions  de  Vie  des  ménages),  or  the  integrated  household  living  conditions  survey.  This
survey was carried out nationwide, in all 30 of Rwanda's districts. The survey covered 14,308
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households.  The  data  collection  was  carried  out  over  the  period  of  about  one  year,  from
November 2nd, 2010 until October 24th, 2011. The EICV surveys are done every 5 years in order
to gauge the progress of poverty alleviation in the country (NISR, 2012).
The sampling was carried out using a two-stage stratified method. Villages to be sampled
were  selected  using  a  Probability  Proportional  to  Size  randomized selection  technique.  This
technique allows for random selection of villages, while also up-weighting the chances of larger
villages being selected into the sample,  as those larger villages are  thought  to have a  larger
impact  on  the  total  population  sample.  This  technique  is  used  in  many  types  of  statistical
samples, particularly when the clustering units have very different sizes (NISR, 2012). Due to
this sampling style, all analysis in this paper uses probability-weighted regression.
After the villages were selected, nine households were selected in each village within the
Kigali City province, and twelve households were selected in each village within the other four
provinces  (North,  South,  East,  West).  Households  were  selected  based  on  a  list  of
dwellings/addresses. The response rate for the selected households was quite high, at 98%. A
negligible number of houses were excluded from the sample due to deaths, abandoned houses,
destroyed houses, or lack of a competent family member present in the house able to complete
the survey. Once the sampling was completed, and the data compiled, weights were given to each
household equal to the inverse of its probability of being selected into the sample. This was in
order to make any analysis of the household data more representative of the total population. For
the respondents of the EICV3, the data included demographic information such as age, gender,
land ownership data on plots, birth district, district of residence, marital status, and schooling
information. 
Land inheritance is a logical choice for this analysis because it is a significant event in
life, and it is not subject to significant recall bias, and is still the most significant form of wealth
in rural Rwanda. As well, land which has been divested post-1999 is covered by the Success law,
and so parents are bound by the law in divesting land to their children equally, something which
can't be avoided by altering a will. 
 The proportion of total household expenditures devoted to goods which are preferred by
a particular party in the household is used as an indicator of the level of bargaining power that
the  party  has  within  the  household.  A higher  ratio  of  female  goods  expenditures  to  total
household expenditures, ceteris paribus, suggests a higher level of female bargaining power. In
order  to  determine  the  effect  that  female  land  inheritance  may have  on a  family's  resource
allocation habits, a simple empirical analysis strategy will be used. This strategy is similar to the
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one  employed  in  Hoddinot  &  Haddad  (1995).  The  authors  used  household  income  and
expenditure data  in Côte D'Ivoire  to  test  the unitary household theory against  a  cooperative
bargaining model. They assumed, as in the divorce threat models, that the two (male and female)
heads of a household have differing preferences, and different shares of the household's total
assets. 
The authors suggest that non-wage “unearned income” is a good measure of asset control,
and in this case the unearned income is replaced by Rwandan land holdings. Land holdings are a
good measure of asset control, as the strength of threat points not only depends on the actual
contribution  of  each  family  member  to  the  household's  total  assets,  but  the  perceived
contribution. Land holdings are very visible assets to other family members, and particularly in
very  agriculture-dependent  Rwanda  they  provide  significantly  valuable  extra-marital  income
options for the owner(s).
The expenditure functions which are estimated take the following form;






θ sj∗ (zs)+β3 j∗ (PFEM )+ϵ j
Yj = expenditures on the jth type of good/ total household expenditures;
lpcexp = log of per capita expenditures;
lsize = log of household size (number of family members);
demr = proportion of demographic group j in the household;
zs = a vector of dummy variables, includes variables for household district of residence, whether
or not the husband or wife attended any school, and the ages of the husband and wife, as well as
the size of each household's total landholdings;
PFEM = proportion of total land holdings which are female inherited land. (Female Inherited
Land / Total Household Land) 
εj = the error term
α j , β1 j , β2 j , β3 j , δrj ,  and  θsj are parameters to be estimated.
Household  expenditures  have  been  grouped  into  eight  different  categories  including
men's goods, women's goods, children's goods, general adult's goods, household goods, other
goods,  and food.  In an analysis  of this  type,  the market  value of  consumed food should be
entered  into  the  food  expenditures  category.  This  data  represents  the  opportunity  cost  of
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consumption,  and  so  is  included.  The  female  and  male  goods  categories  were  created  by
determining which could be generally attributed to use by either males or females. Goods which
were  ambiguous  in  this  nature,  and not  clearly household  goods were  placed in  the  “Adult
Goods”  category.  Figure  1  shows  the  goods  which  were  included  in  the  “Female  Goods”
category and the “Male Goods” category.
Figure 1. Female Goods and Male Goods Categories
lpcexp  is  the  natural  log  of  the  sum of  all  expenditures  divided  by the  size  of  the
household. The members of the households were assigned to one of 16 categories based upon
their age, gender, and position in the family. The number of each type of person was then divided
by the household size, to get the proportion of that demographic category in each household.
Each household's total female-associated land inheritances were divided by the household's total
land holdings, to get the female-controlled share of land assets, PFEM. 
It is possible to disaggregate the ownership and method of acquisition of land parcels, as
the EICV3 questionnaire asked about land ownership of each household member individually,
and about how the land was acquired. Unfortunately the data does not include information about
the dates of land transfers, the dates of marriages, or the dates of death for many parents.
In order for the relationship to be established as causal, the variation in land inheritance
should be exogenous to the error terms in the regressions. It is possible that a certain level of
exogeneity holds, as women in Rwanda don't generally make the decision about how much land
to  inherit.  Female  land  inheritances  are  a  function  of  a  woman's  family's  landholdings,  her
parents'  beliefs,  her  number  of  siblings,  and  other  things  beyond  her  control.  There  are
undoubtedly some parts of the error term which are correlated with female land inheritances. The
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Goods in Female Goods Category Goods in Male Goods Category
Fabric for Women Fabric for Men
Wrap Around Cloth for Women Men's Garments
Women's Garments Men's Underwear
Women's Underwear Men's Tailoring
Women's Tailoring Men's Footwear
Women's Footwear Men's Clothing Accessories
Women's Clothing Accessories Watches
Jewelry
Handbags
Dressing Tables (Vanity Table)
question is not  if estimates are biased but simply  by how much. This is, however, a common
caveat of every microeconomic analysis ever undertaken. 
Because  of  the  issues  of  endogeneity,  this  analysis  is  ripe  for  the  use  of  estimation
techniques  which  remove  this  endogeneity,  such  as  difference-in-difference  or  instrumental
variables approaches.
A difference-in-difference technique can be used with panel or pooled cross-sectional
datasets. However, the different rounds of the survey would need to include the same covariates,
land  inheritance/ownership  information,  and  detailed  expenditures  data.  Unfortunately,  the
previous  rounds  of  the  EICV (rounds  1  and  2)  do  not  include  any information  about  land
ownership, and very limited expenditure data. For this reason, this analysis is unable to include a
difference-in-differences analysis. 
An instrumental variables technique could be used to purge the estimates of endogeneity.
A variable  which  is  correlated  with  female  land inheritance,  but  uncorrelated  with  all  other
unobservables that affect female intrahousehold bargaining power; that variable could be used in
place  of  PFEM  in  order  to  get  unbiased  estimates  of  the  effect  of  land  inheritance  on
intrahousehold  bargaining  power.  This  extra  “instrumental  variable”  would  need  to  be
influencing  female  intrahousehold  bargaining  power  through  no  other  channel  than  land
inheritance.
IV. DATA AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the dataset are represented in table 1 of the Appendix. After
limiting the data to only husband-and-wife households with children, 8934 households remain in
the sample used for analysis. Of these, 8525 households include at least one landowner.  There
are 5659 households which have both husband and wife who went to school.  There are 787
households in which both husband and wife who have never been to school. The mean family
size is 5.58 people, with the average number of children being 2.68. The average number of male
children per household is 1.35, and the average number of female children is very similar at 1.34.
Average school expenditures per year per household are 2380.05 Rwandan Francs (RWF)
with the average school-related spending on all female children in the household being 1226.91
RWF and the average for male children being slightly less at 1153.14 RWF. 
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The average amount of landholdings per household is .62 hectares. There is a significant
range of landholdings per household, with the minimum being of course zero, and the maximum
that  any one  household  owns  being 66 hectares.  The average  amount  of  inherited  land  per
household is  .25 ha,  with the maximum being 33 ha.  The average female land holdings per
household is .07 ha, with the maximum being 11.15 ha. The average amount of female inherited
land per household is .03 ha with the maximum being 7.7 ha. These numbers are quite a bit
smaller than the average male inherited land which is .22 ha, and the maximum male inherited
land per household which is 33 ha. The average proportion of household land controlled by
females  is  about  15%,  and  the  average  proportion  of  land  per  household  which  is  female
inherited land is 6%. For 1209 households, female land is 100% of the land they own, and for
166  households,  100% of  their  land  is  female  inherited  land.  See  figure  3  for  a  graphical
representation of average levels of different types of land per household in the sample. See figure
4 for a graphical representation of means of different types of female-owned land as a proportion
of total household land in the sample. 
All  income and expenditure  data  are  calculated using  information  for  the 12 months
covered in the survey. This is likely a representative set of information about the general level of
assets  and  expenditures  associated  with  each  household.  The  average  proportion  of  total
expenditures on school expenses is 1%. The average for adult male goods is 8%, female goods
11%, child goods 8%, households goods 18%, and adult goods in general 26%.
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Figure 3. Mean Values for Types of Household Landholdings
 Figure 4. Mean Proportion of Household Land that is Female Land in the Sample
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4.2 Regression Results
All  main  regressions  reported  use  outcome  variables  which  are  the  proportion  of
household total expenditures devoted to the various good types.
When  the  ratio  of  female  inherited  land  to  household  land  is  graphed  against  the
predicted values of household budget share devoted to female goods, one can see a clear positive
relationship between the two. Below is the graph with 95% confidence intervals in figure 5. The
predicted  values  come  from  the  main  OLS  regression  specification  which  is;






θ sj∗ (zs)+β3 j∗ (PFEM )+ϵ j
Where Yj is the ratio of female goods expenditures to total household expenditures, and
the rest of the variables are as previously explained. This is also the specification for the main
OLS/ Tobit regression models.
Figure 5. Positive relationship between female inherited land and budget share of female goods.
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All coefficients in regression output tables represent percentages in their current form (ex.
a coefficient of 2.5 means that for a unit increase in the independent variable, the dependent
variable  increases  by 2.5%).  Coefficients  on  family demographic  composition  variables  and
district  indicator variables are  suppressed.  The main concern was the impact  that  the PFEM
would have on the budget share of female goods and male goods, as substitution into the former
from  the  latter  would  be  an  indicator  of  female  preferences  being  reflected  in  household
consumption decisions. 
Tobit models were used when censoring at zero was a concern; in the cases of school
expenditures, and food purchases. Otherwise, OLS regressions were used. The main regression
estimates suggest that the proportion of a household's landholdings made up of female inherited
land (PFEM) has a significantly positive relationship with the household budget share devoted to
female goods, and food expenditures, and a negative significant relationship with budget share
devoted to male goods.
For a 1 unit  increase in the (PFEM), there is an associated increase of 1.42% on the
budget share devoted to female goods (significant at the 1% level), and a 7.93% (significant at
the 5% level) increase of the share spent on food. While observing these increases, a decrease in
the budget share devoted to male goods of .71% (significant at the 10% level) is observed.  These
findings are consistent with the presence of female-preferential consumption shifts brought about
by  increases  in  the  share  of  household  assets  controlled  by  females,  as  found  in  previous
research. The results of these regressions are found in table 6.
All of the households who do not own land were removed from the sample, and the same
analysis  was  performed,  in  order  to  see  if  the  results  are  driven  by  systematic  differences
between households with and without land. The model suggests that for this sample, a 1 unit
increase in PFEM is associated with an increase in the proportion of the budget spent on female
goods by 1.39% (significant at the 1% level) and decreases the male goods budget share by .72%
(significant at the 10% level). These results are shown in table 7. This suggests that among the
landowning population, increased female land inheritance is associated with increased female
bargaining power.
 Using the  PFEM as  the  main  independent  variable  in  this  analysis  seems  intuitive.
However,  when looking for  a  link  between asset  ownership  and higher  levels  of  bargaining
power, the independent variable of concern was specified in different ways, to see if a common
theme would emerge. If female bargaining power is increased through a woman having higher
19
levels of assets, then other measures of relative asset levels should show the same pattern that
PFEM does. 
In order to explore this, PFEM is replaced with the ratio of all female land (not simply
female inherited land)  to  all  household land,  in  the regression specifications.  The estimation
returns  a coefficient  of .58 (significant  at  the 1% level)  for the female goods outcome, -.52
(significant at the 1% level) for the male goods outcome, and a coefficient of 6.37 (significant at
the 1% level) for the food expenditures outcome. These are of relatively similar magnitudes and
significance  levels  with  the  estimates  from  the  main  PFEM  model.  These  coefficients  are
reported in table 8. 
To  further  test  the  theory  that  female  asset  shares  affect  intrahousehold  budgetary
allocations, the sample is limited to only women who were under the age of 33 at the time of the
survey. These women would have been younger than 21 (the median age of marriage in Rwanda)
at the time of the passage of the Succession law. Marriage is a time when Rwandans are likely to
inherit land from their parents. Even though the data do not show significant increases in land
inheritance rates in women who are more likely to have inherited under the Succession law, land
inheritances subject to the Succession law are potentially more exogenous since the government
has legally stripped away a good deal of the discretion that parents have when deciding which
children to give land to. It would be more evidence in favor of the link between female land
inheritances and bargaining power if  these households show the same pattern as the general
sample. 
The data for these younger women's households does show a relatively similar pattern to
the previous estimates. The estimations show that for a 1 unit increase in the PFEM, there is an
associated 1.27% (significant at the 10% level) increase in the proportion of the budget spent on
female  goods.  The  point  estimate  on  male  goods  is  -.61.  This  estimate  is  not  statistically
significant at conventional levels, however it is negative and of a similar magnitude observed in
the previous estimations. These results are shown in table 9.
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When the ratio of female inherited land to male inherited land is used as the independent
variable, we see a positive and significant relationship between that and the budget share spent
on  household  goods  (1.62  significant  at  the  10%  level),  and  a  negative  and  significant
relationship with the ratio and the budget share spent on male goods (-.75 significant at the 1%
level).  These results are presented in table 101. 
When this independent variable is tweaked slightly and becomes female inherited land
over total inherited land, instead of the ratio of male and female inherited land (which likely has
differential  effects  at  different levels of total  household land) the familiar  pattern reemerges.
When using female inherited land as a proportion of the household's total inherited landholdings,
estimates  show that  this  ratio  has  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  with  female  goods
budget  share  (coefficient  .62  significant  at  the  5%  level)  and  a  negative  and  significant
relationship with male goods budget share (coefficient -.79 significant at the 1% level). These
results are presented in table 11.
To further test the idea that asset control contributes to bargaining power, it makes sense
to examine the relationship that male land control has with budget shares. Based on the previous
analysis,  we would  expect  to  see an  increase  in  land share  controlled  by the  male  head of
household associated with higher levels of male goods purchases, and lower levels of female
goods purchases.
When the ratio of male land to total household land is used in place of PFEM, we do see
the reverse pattern of household expenditures. The ratio of male land to household land has a
positive and significant relationship with budget share of male goods (coefficient .62 significant
at the 1% level) and a negative and significant relationship with budget share of female goods
(coefficient -.59 significant at the 1% level). The results of these estimations is in table 12. This
provides further support for the proposition that land ownership can translate into bargaining
power within Rwandan households2.
However, when male inherited land over total household land is the main independent
variable, regressions show that it has a positive relationship with budget share of male goods,
female goods, and food, with no significant negative relationship with any of the budget shares.
1 There is a very large negative and highly statistically significant coefficient on food expenditures (-133.29 significant at the 1%
level). This coefficient is relatively large and in an unexpected direction. Perhaps this is a spurious result, (something which is the
result of the fact that the dataset doesn't include many values for the value of food grown and consumed) or one which speaks to
potential differences in the types of crops which are grown on male vs female inherited land. If female land is more likely to be
used for subsistence farming, then increasing the share of inherited land that belongs to females could reduce the amount that a
household spends on outside food.
2 The coefficient on food is positive, 9.14 and significant at the 1% level, further lending support to the idea that perhaps the 
ownership of different parcels of land has an effect on the outside food expenditures of households in Rwanda. While this 
question is an interesting one, it is outside of the scope of this paper.
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The coefficient on male goods (.94 significant at the 1% level) is substantially higher than the
coefficient on female goods (.55 significant at the 5% level), potentially revealing a male-goods
bias correlated with a higher ratio of male inherited land to household land. The results of these
regressions are shown in table 13.
The positive coefficients on male and female goods could be due to the fact that males
are  often  the  heads  of  household,  and  expected  to  provide  goods  for  all  members  of  the
household by Rwandan custom and culture. Men who are given larger endowments of land are
likely made economically better  off  than those which receive smaller endowments,  and thus
more able to provide goods for themselves and other members of their households. 
This result could also be due to the possibility that male children are given relatively
more productive land than female children, whether because of a male child bias, or the fact that
they are often expected to have to provide for an entire household. If the land which men inherit
is on average more productive than the land that women inherit, then increased levels of male
inherited land in a household's landholdings could lead to an overall increase in income, and to
increased consumption of goods which other members of the household might enjoy. In order to
study this further, variables which capture heterogeneity among land parcels (ruggedness, soil
quality, etc.) could be used, but these sorts of variables were not included in the EICV3. 
4.3 Instrumental Variables Approach
The use of an exogenous source of variation in this analysis would greatly improve the
confidence in the estimates given. A number of instrumental variables were created in an attempt
to  identify  exogenous  variation  in  the  independent  variable,  and  deal  with  any  present
endogeneity bias.
 An indicator variable was created for those households with wives who would have been
more likely to  inherit  under the Succession law,  based upon the median age of  marriage in
Rwanda, which is 21. The variable takes the value of 1 if the woman was younger than 21 at the
time of the passage of the Succession law in 1999, otherwise it takes the value of zero. When this
was regressed on whether or not a female inherited land, and then regressed on the amount of
land that a female inherited, the coefficients were both negative and significant. These estimates
are shown in table 2. Adding in district controls leaves the coefficients negative and significant,
as shown in table 3. When controls for the age of husband or wife are added, the coefficients lose
all significance. These estimates are shown in table 4 and table 5. It seems that there is not very
large predictive power of inheritances in the age of female heads of household.
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It seems plausible that the different districts of Rwanda could show significantly different
inheritance patterns due to varying levels of knowledge and/or enforcement of the Succession
law, and that women from particular districts might be more likely to inherit land, and posses
higher levels of intrahousehold bargaining power. It would be useful to be able to use this type of
regional variation in de-facto inheritance rules as a source of exogenous variation in inheritances,
as  authors  Heath  and  Tan do in  their  paper  on  the  labor  market  implications  of  the  Hindu
Succession Law in India (Heath & Tan, 2014). 
In order to explore this, the mean values of total female land, total female inherited land,
and female inherited land as a proportion of total household land among others were calculated
for each of the 30 Rwandan districts. A sample of these numbers are reported below in figure 2.
Figure 2. “High Inheritance” Districts
Gakenke, Nyamagbe, Kamonyi, and Nyamasheke districts all will be refered to as “high
inheritance” districts because the average ratio of household land that is female inherited land in
each of the districts is over ten percent, with the exception of Nyamasheke at 9.3 percent. The
average  levels  of  total  female  land,  and  the  average  ratio  of  female  inherited  land to  male
inherited land are also relatively high in these districts.
Using a simple probit model with basic controls, an indicator variable corresponding to 
the female household head's land inheritance was regressed on an indicator variable which equals
1 if the household resides in a high inheritance district. The estimates show that residing in one 
of these districts has a statistically significant positive relationship with land inheritance. These 
estimates are shown in figure 3.
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Means Gakenke Nyamagbe Kamonyi Nyamasheke Nyagatare Gicumbi Nyabihu Ngororero Nyarugenge
Total Female Land 0.086 0.155 0.122 0.122 0.110 0.108 0.131 0.103 0.045
Female Inherited Land 0.043 0.056 0.075 0.048 0.013 0.051 0.023 0.060 0.023
Fem Land/ Total Land 0.190 0.272 0.252 0.200 0.163 0.159 0.231 0.103 0.239
Fem Inher Land/ Total Land 0.102 0.150 0.135 0.093 0.014 0.079 0.053 0.063 0.054
Fem Inher/ Male Inher 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.004
Fem Land/ Male Land 0.181 0.022 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.050
Fem Inher / Male Inher 0.187 0.257 0.248 0.194 0.200 0.157 0.172 0.098 0.315
Figure 3. Region Associated With Land Inheritance
The “high  inheritance”  indicator  variable  was  used  as  a  proxy variable  in  the  main
regression specification in place of the ratio of female inherited land to household land. This, or
any source of variation could only be considered exogenous if it affects land inheritances, but
does  not  affect  intrahousehold  bargaining  power  through  any  channel  other  than  land
inheritances. For this variable to provide exogenous variation, the assumption must be made that
the differences in inheritance rates regionally are as good as random (potentially from exogenous
differences in the implementation or knowledge level about the Succession law).
The  estimates  of  this  regression  specification  do  not  follow the  same pattern  as  the
previous  estimates.  Table 14 shows the results,  and show that  residing in  a high inheritance
district  is  positively  and  significantly  correlated  with  school  expenditures,  and  household
expenditures, and negatively and significantly correlated with child goods expenditures. It does
not seem to affect the budget share spent on male or female goods in any significant way. These
estimates are quite similar to what was found in Hoddinot & Haddad 1991, 1995. 
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Inheritance Predicted by Region
(1)
LABELS Female Inherited Land?
Log of per capita expenditures 0.13***
(0.01)










Total Household Land -0.12***
(0.02)
High Inheritance District? 0.36***
(0.04)
Observations 8,524
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When a 2 stage least squares estimation method is used with the same high inheritance
district  variable  as  an  instrument  for  PFEM,  the  results  are  also  similar  to  those  found  by
Hoddinot & Haddad, with the exception of the food coefficient. The results, which are shown in
table 15, show a positive and significant relationship between (instrumented) PFEM and school
expenditures, female school expenditures, and household goods. They also show that it has a
negative and significant relationship with child goods,  and food expenditures.  The similarity
between these results, and those of previous research give hope that this instrument could be
providing a source of exogenous variation through which we can see the effects that increased
female inheritance has on budget shares spent on different types of goods. It is likely, however,
that living in the high inheritance districts is also correlated with other factors which influence
female  intrahousehold  bargaining  power,  and  that  the  instrument  does  not  meet  the  strict
exclusion restriction. 
Useful instruments can sometimes be created by examining the effects of the arbitrary,
heterogeneous implementation of a law or policy. Often a law or policy affects behavior, and it is
impossible or unlikely that individuals have selected into being affected by such. This creates the
opportunity to use the law/policy rule as an instrument for the endogenous behavior which it
might predict. An example of this is in Heath & Tan, 2014 where the authors use the differences
in Hindu Succession Law amendment timing in Indian states to estimate the effect that increased
land  inheritances  has  on  female  participation  in  labor  markets.  The  women  were  affected
differently by the law(s), but were not self-selecting into or out of areas which were or weren't
affected by the law. This, along with the age of women at marriage were used as instruments for
land inheritances.
In a further search for an instrument, the literature concerning the implementation and
enforcement  of  the  Succession  law was  reviewed.  Also,  the  literature  concerning  the  Land
Tenure Regularization Program (LTRP) was examined. The LTRP was a process through which
the Rwandan government registered and recorded the location,  dimensions and ownership of
every single parcel of land in the country (Kairaba & Simons,  (n.d.)).  The government  also
recorded  which  property  was  jointly  owned  by  husbands  and  wives,  as  well  as  officially
recording future inheritors of land. This law, along with the Succession law are believed to have
significant effects on the propensity for women to inherit land. Researchers in Rwanda have
shown that simply the official recognition of current or future land ownership has given women
hope  that  they  will  not  be  discriminated  against  in  land  inheritances  and  when  asserting
inheritance rights in court  (Kairaba & Simons, n.d., GMO, 2014). 
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In the case of Rwanda,  the LTRP was implemented uniformly nationwide, and while it
has likely had an impact on inheritances, does not provide any regional variation which could be
exploited. However, the creation of another instrumental variable comes from the variance in the
level  of  knowledge  of  the  Succession  law  in  different  districts.  The  more  prevalent  the
knowledge of the law among the female population in a district, theoretically, the more likely
those women would be to use the law to ensure that they inherit land. Female knowledge of the
Succession law is highly influenced in rural areas by television and radio advertisements, along
with newspaper and other print campaigns seeking to increase awareness of its existence (GMO,
2014). These campaigns are carried out throughout Rwanda, and it is assumed that exposure to
them is as good as random.
The  Rwandan  Gender  Monitoring  Office  (GMO)  is  an  arm of  the  Rwandan  central
government which studies issues of gender inequality and gender-based violence and implements
programs  aimed  at  alleviating  such  inequalities.  Their  website  states  that  the  “GMO  is  a
regulatory body for the compliance of gender principles and mechanisms of eradications and
fighting gender based violence in Rwanda” (GMO, 2014). The GMO released a report in 2011
which  was  the  result  of  a  research  effort  aimed  at  understanding  issues  regarding  the
implementation of the Succession law. The authors of the report established that among the 15
districts surveyed,  Kamonyi, Gicumbi, Nyagatare, Gasabo, Kirehe, and Burera all had over 30%
of the female respondents answer that they were aware of the existence of the Succession law.
The other surveyed districts had female Succession law knowledge rates sometimes as low as
10.3%. The 6 districts with the highest knowledge rates are referred to as “high knowledge”
districts.
After limiting the sample to the 15 districts which were included in the GMO study, a
simple probit  model  is  used to  estimate the affect  that  living in  one of the high knowledge
districts has on the propensity of inheriting land, and then an OLS model was used to see if
living in a high knowledge district predicts the size of inherited parcels. The results of these
regressions are show in table 16. This exercise reveals that living in a high knowledge district
does not seem to correlate very strongly with a higher propensity to inherit land for females, nor
does it seem to correlate at all with inheriting larger parcels of land. There is a positive and
significant coefficient on whether or not a female inherits land, but smaller than expected. There
is no significant relationship between parcel size and living in a high knowledge district.
Using  a  2-stage  least  squares  regression  method,  the  variable  for  whether  or  not  a
household is in a high knowledge district is used as an instrument for PFEM. The results of these
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regressions  are  shown in  table  17.  These  estimates  show that  (instrumented)  PFEM has  no
statistically significant relationship with any of the outcome budget shares other than a small
negative coefficient on female goods (-.27 significant at the 10% level). This makes sense, as the
high  knowledge  indicator  variable  did  not  strongly  correlate  with  levels  of  inheritance  or
inheritance size. Unfortunately, this avenue of inquiry did not prove to be an effective strategy
for  revealing  a  relationship  between  female  land  inheritance  and  intrahousehold  bargaining
power.  However,  the  result  that  increased  female  knowledge  of  the  Succession  law  is  not
significantly correlated to inheritances in a strong way, is interesting to know. This idea could be
the basis of a paper in and of itself, and warrants further data collection and research.
4.4 Distribution of Error Terms
There is always concern about the possibility that estimation results could be driven by
heteroskedasticity of error terms.  To test  for this, Cook-Weisberg tests  for  heteroskedasticity
were performed on each of the regression specifications. The tests always returned p-values of
zero,  which lead to rejection of the null  hypothesis that the variance of errors in the data is
constant. 
In order to further verify this, a scatter plot was created with the residuals of the PFEM
on female goods regression. This shows that the variance of the errors is not constant. The graph
also  includes  a  non-parametric  graph  of  the  average  of  the  residuals  with  95% confidence
intervals. That graph is shown in figure 5. It is due to the results of these tests, that all regression
specifications were used with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Concerns about the non-normality of errors were assuaged through graphing them in a
histogram. The error terms are quite normally distributed. The results of this procedure is shown
in figure 6. 
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Figure 5. Heteroskedasticity of Errors
Figure 6. Normality of Errors
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There  is  the  likelihood  that  endogeneity  between  the  independent  and  dependent
variables could cause bias in the coefficient estimates. The bias could be large or small, however,
it  is  not  guaranteed  to  change  the  direction  of  the  point  estimates.  This  is  consistent  with
Quisumbing & de La Brière (2000), where the authors found that not controlling for endogeneity,
between assets brought to marriage and intrahousehold bargaining power, could lead to bias in
estimates of the effect of the former on the latter. They used an instrumental variable approach to
purge  their  estimates  of  some  amount  of  endogeneity  by  using  family  characteristics  as
instruments for assets brought to marriage.  This would have been the ideal approach for the
current analysis. However, multi-generational family data for the subjects in the EICV3 sample
is  not  available.  While  the  authors  establish  that  estimates  of  this  nature  can  be  biased  by
endogeneity, the signs of their estimates did not change due to such bias. 
The use of instrumental variables in the current analysis has sought to purge some of the
endogeneity from the original estimates, however, due to the lack of a very strong instrument
which meets the exclusion restriction, the success in this realm was limited.
The pattern in the main regression specifications, of a positive relationship of PFEM with
female goods along with the negative relationship with male goods, is consistent with predictions
of  a  divorce  threat  intrahousehold  bargaining model.  The divorce  threat  model  predicts  that
females with larger shares of household assets should be able to exert more influence on the
resource  allocation  decision(s)  of  their  households,  causing  them  to  arrive  at  consumption
bundles  more  in  line  with  their  preferences.  Analysis  of  the  data  shows  that  when  female
inherited land makes up a larger percentage of household assets, households tend to spend higher
shares of income on female goods and smaller shares on male goods, theoretically increasing the
welfare of female heads of household. 
It could be possible that females with higher shares of inherited land are for some reason
systematically increasing female goods consumption by forgoing consumption of other goods
which they prefer, such as child schooling or household goods. If this were the case, positive and
significant coefficients on PFEM for female goods might be seen, while also seeing negative and
significant coefficients on goods that females have been shown to highly value, such as child
schooling.  However,  there was not  strong evidence found in the data  to  suggest that  this  is
happening. The only substitution seems to be female goods for male goods, which suggests that




This paper has explored whether or not increased female asset ownership has an effect on
female  intrahousehold  bargaining  power  in  Rwanda.  Much  of  the  literature  suggests  that
households do not pool their incomes and maximize a joint utility function, but that household
resource allocation is the result of bargaining between household members (generally a husband
and wife as the male and female heads of household). 
Through regression analysis of a representative household survey dataset from Rwanda,
this  paper  has  shown that  increasing  female  land  inheritance  as  a  share  of  total  household
landholdings is associated with a shift in consumption towards female goods and away from
male goods in Rwandan households. The findings are consistent with other papers which have
examined similar research questions, and with the predictions of a divorce-threat intrahousehold
Nash-bargaining model. This is evidence in favor of the predictive power of bargaining models
in describing household resource allocation. It is also proposed that these increases in female
goods  consumption  are  the  result  of  bargaining  power  dynamics,  and  not  due  to  females
substituting child education, or household goods for their own consumption of goods. 
Through an instrumental variable analysis, most of the findings of Hoddinot and Haddad
1991 and 1995 were replicated,  showing increases in the instrumented PFEM variable to be
related  to  increased consumption of  schooling,  particularly female  schooling,  and household
goods, while also showing a decrease in consumption of child goods. 
There is hesitation to claim that a causal link has been definitively identified between
female land inheritances and increases in bargaining power, as inferred from goods expenditures.
To do so would require more adequately addressing the issues of endogeneity which surround
land inheritance  data.  Significant  effort  was made in  order  to  use an  instrumental  variables
approach to arrive at a causal interpretation of estimates, with limited success. 
However,  in  the main specifications,  the significance,  magnitude and direction of the
main  coefficients  of  interest  stay  relatively  constant  when  the  sample  is  limited  to  only
landowners or only women who would likely inherit after the Succession law, and by changing
the  independent  variable  of  interest  to  different  measures  of  relative  land  ownership.  This
suggests that there is a relationship between female asset control, particularly inherited land, and
female intrahousehold bargaining power.
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With more detailed familial and historical data for each individual in the EICV3 survey,
future research could purge significant endogeneity from these types of estimates. In order to
more finely examine the budget-share effects  of  female land inheritance,  more detailed data
collection  about  household  purchases  could  be  used  to  create  an increased number  of  more
specifically defined expenditure share categories.  
This research furthers the literature of intrahousehold bargaining in developing countries,
household resource allocation models (unitary vs. Nash-bargaining), and female land inheritance.
It is the first study which examines how female inheritance affects intrahousehold bargaining
power of Rwandan women. It adds to a relatively small body of literature concerned with asset
control and intrahousehold bargaining in developing countries in general.
Hoddinot and Haddad, in their 1995 paper used unearned income data and expenditure
data to explore how asset control affects household budget allocation. The current paper is the
first to use the EICV3 dataset to analyze land inheritance and household budget allocations in a
similar  fashion.  This  analysis  is  also somewhat  novel  in  that  it  uses  land-type  ratios  as  the
independent variation. Quisumbing & de la Brière perform a very similar analysis to the current
one, except they were able to use strong instruments for assets brought to marriage, purging
some of the inherent endogeneity between asset control and intrahousehold bargaining power.
This  research  paper  provides  a  starting  point  for  future  researchers  of  Rwanda  who  will
hopefully  and  likely have  access  to  richer  (perhaps  panel)  datasets,  allowing  them to  more
effectively deal with endogeneity bias. 
In an effort to follow Quisumbing & de la Brière and Heath & Tan in using an instrument
to purge endogeneity, this paper sought to find a plausible source of exogeneity which would
serve in place of the ratio of female inherited land to total household land. The fact that the
knowledge of the Succession law does not seem to be a strong predictor of land inheritances is
an interesting result in and of itself, even if it proved to be an ineffective instrumental variable.
Allendorf's 2007 paper concerning female land ownership, child outcomes, and female decision
making power likely suffers from similar endogeneity concerns. The paper presents a compelling
story like this one, which has significant implications for the individuals involved. The fact that
this paper and Allendorf's papers explain parallel themes of female land control being positively
associated with intrahousehold bargaining power lends external validity to the conclusions of
both. This paper lends support to the idea that asset control does have significant implications for
female bargaining power which the emerging literature seems to generally be corroborating. 
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Increases in female bargaining power within and outside of households is a goal of many
Rwandan advocacy groups seeking to further female empowerment. These organizations could
benefit from the knowledge that asset ownership is a strong predictor of female decision-making
power. They could do well by promoting female land ownership and inheritance in the interest of
improving  the  life  outcomes  of  Rwandan  women.  The  government  of  Rwanda  is  currently
examining changes to its “Succession law” and would benefit from an analysis such as this, in
order to understand the positive female empowerment outcomes which can result from increased
protections of female inheritance rights. 
It is still debatable, whether or not increases in female empowerment are good for overall
economic development of a country. The Rwandan government will need to weigh the possibility
of  slowing  economic  development  against  the  benefits  of  promoting  female  empowerment,
which many view as a valuable goal intrinsically, and which can have significant positive effects
on children's outcomes. In the long run, the children of relatively more-empowered women could
live  longer  and  more  successful  lives,  adding  to  the  economic  development  of  Rwanda,
potentially more than making up for any current economic slowdown which might be linked to
shifting asset control to women. 
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Appendix
Table 1. Summary Statistics
36
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Family Size 8934 5.58 1.95 3 22
# Female Children 8934 1.34 1.18 0 8
# Male Children 8934 1.35 1.18 0 7
# All Children 8934 2.68 1.68 0 10
School Expenditures 8934 2380.05 12012.98 0 270000
Female School Expenditures 8934 1226.91 7248.13 0 189000
Male School Expenditures 8934 1153.14 7996.87 0 270000
Household Total Land 8934 0.62 1.45 0 66
Household Female Land 8934 0.07 0.37 0 11.15
Household Inherited Land 8934 0.25 0.81 0 33
Household Female Inherited land 8934 0.03 0.19 0 7.7
Household Male Inherited land 8934 0.22 0.79 0 33
Proportion of Household Land that is;
Female Land 8934 0.15 0.35 0 1
Female Inherited Land 8934 0.06 0.2 0 1
Proportion of Household Expenditures that are;
School Expenditures 8934 0.95 3.55 0 92.98
Female School Expenditures 8934 0.49 2.4 0 92.98
Male School Expenditures 8934 0.47 2.37 0 61.61
Adult Male Goods 8934 8.08 5.95 0 50
Adult Female Goods 8934 11.09 6.86 0 46.33
Child Goods 8934 7.87 7.22 0 72
Household Goods 8934 17.74 15.81 0 99.99
General Adult Goods 8934 25.58 11.59 0 99.68
Proportion of household that are;
Females, age 0 to 10 8934 0.18 0.16 0 0.71
Females, age 11 to 20 8934 0.09 0.12 0 0.6
Females, age 21 to 30 8934 0.08 0.12 0 0.57
Females, age 31 to 40 8934 0.06 0.1 0 0.4
Females, age 41 to 50 8934 0.04 0.07 0 0.4
Females, age 51 to 60 8934 0.03 0.07 0 0.33
Females, age 61 to 70 8934 0.01 0.05 0 0.33
Females over 70 8934 0.01 0.05 0 0.33
Males, age 0 to 10 8934 0.18 0.16 0 0.71
Males, age 11 to 20 8934 0.1 0.13 0 0.67
Males, age 21 to 30 8934 0.11 0.13 0 0.6
Males, age 31 to 40 8934 0.06 0.09 0 0.5
Males, age 41 to 50 8934 0.03 0.07 0 0.33
Males, age 51 to 60 8934 0.02 0.06 0 0.33
Males, age 61 to 70 8934 0.01 0.04 0 0.33
Males over 70 8934 0 0.03 0 0.33
Female Children 0 to 6 8934 0.12 0.14 0 0.67
Female Children 7 to 12 8934 0.07 0.11 0 0.6
Female Children 13 to 18 8934 0.04 0.08 0 0.6
Male Children 0 to 6 8934 0.12 0.15 0 0.67
Male Children 7 to 12 8934 0.07 0.11 0 0.6
Male Children 13 to 18 8934 0.04 0.08 0 0.5
Table 2. Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
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Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
(1) (2)
Probit OLS
VARIABLES Inherited Land Yes/No Size of Inherited Parcels
-0.23*** -0.02***
(0.06) (0.00)
Log of family size 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.01)
Husband School -0.11* -0.01
(0.06) (0.01)
Wife School -0.06 -0.01
(0.05) (0.01)





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Female Likely to have been married 
after the Succession law
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses
Table 3. Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance with District Controls
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Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
(1) (2)
Probit OLS
VARIABLES Inherited Land Yes/No Size of Inherited Parcels
-0.22*** -0.01***
(0.05) (0.00)
Log of family size 0.02 0.01
(0.07) (0.01)
Husband School -0.10* -0.00
(0.06) (0.01)
Wife School -0.06 -0.01*
(0.05) (0.01)
Total Household Land 0.00 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
District Controls X X
Observations 8,934 8,934
R-squared 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Female Likely to have been 
married after the Succession law
Table 4. Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance, District and Husband's Age Controls
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Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
(1) (2)
Probit OLS
VARIABLES Inherited Land Yes/No Size of Inherited Parcels
-0.06 -0.00
(0.06) (0.01)
Log of family size 0.03 0.01
(0.07) (0.01)
Husband School -0.07 -0.00
(0.06) (0.01)
Wife School 0.00 -0.01
(0.05) (0.01)
Total Household Land -0.00 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Husband's Age 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
District Controls X X
Observations 8,934 8,934
R-squared 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Female Likely to have been married 
after the Succession law
Table 5. Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance, District and Wife's Age Controls
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Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
(1) (2)
Probit OLS
VARIABLES Inherited Land Yes/No Size of Inherited Parcels
-0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.01)
Log of family size 0.05 0.01
(0.07) (0.01)
Husband School -0.08 -0.00
(0.06) (0.01)
Wife School 0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (0.01)
Total Household Land -0.00 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Wife's Age 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
District Controls X X
Observations 8,934 8,934
R-squared 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Female Likely to have been married 
after the Succession law
Table 6. Ratio of Female Inherited Land to Total Household Land
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Female Inherited Land over Household Land - Full Sample
(1) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.27*** -0.11 -0.14 -1.14*** -0.08 -1.47*** 1.35*** -8.04***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.27) (1.02)
Log of family size 5.15*** 4.57*** 3.98*** -1.53*** 0.02 2.93*** 1.36 -9.52***
(0.62) (0.64) (0.64) (0.46) (0.43) (0.50) (1.16) (3.66)
Husband School 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.14 0.03 0.12 -1.67*** -5.87
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.50) (3.81)
Wife School 0.38* 0.23 0.24 -0.46** -0.36** 0.34 0.12 0.73
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (3.82)
Husband's Age -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.43*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.24)
Wife's Age 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04* 0.02 0.06** -0.04 0.09
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.22)
Total Household Land -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.14*** -0.11** -0.04 -0.47*** 0.62
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.44)
-0.13 -0.40 0.35 1.42*** -0.71* -0.02 0.67 7.93**
(0.45) (0.42) (0.42) (0.46) (0.39) (0.46) (0.91) (3.53)
Observations 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933
R-squared 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Female Inherited Land /  
Total Household Land
Table 7. Ratio of Female Inherited Land to Total Household Land – Landless Excluded
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Female Inherited Land over Household Land - Landowners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.20** -0.06 -0.09 -1.14*** -0.06 -1.52*** 1.37*** -8.89***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.28) (0.88)
Log of family size 5.12*** 4.58*** 3.82*** -1.57*** -0.14 2.91*** 1.27 -5.18
(0.65) (0.67) (0.67) (0.48) (0.45) (0.53) (1.21) (3.17)
Husband School 0.30 0.21 0.34 0.09 0.01 0.11 -1.78*** -4.56
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.51) (3.10)
Wife School 0.35 0.21 0.19 -0.48** -0.39** 0.37 0.07 -2.66
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (3.32)
Husband's Age -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.23)
Wife's Age 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.04* 0.01 0.05** -0.05 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.20)
Total Household Land -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.14*** -0.11** -0.04 -0.49*** 0.20
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.23)
-0.13 -0.40 0.35 1.39*** -0.72* -0.00 0.47 -3.35
(0.45) (0.42) (0.41) (0.46) (0.39) (0.46) (0.91) (3.25)
Observations 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524
R-squared 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Female Inherited Land /  
Total Household Land
Table 8. All Female Land over Total Household Land
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All Female Land Over Total Household Land - Full Sample
(1) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.27*** -0.10 -0.15 -1.16*** -0.06 -1.47*** 1.33*** -8.31***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.27) (1.02)
Log of family size 5.15*** 4.57*** 3.98*** -1.54*** 0.04 2.92*** 1.35 -10.96***
(0.62) (0.64) (0.64) (0.46) (0.43) (0.50) (1.16) (3.81)
Husband School 0.34 0.26 0.34 0.12 0.04 0.12 -1.68*** -6.12
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.50) (3.83)
Wife School 0.38* 0.22 0.24 -0.48** -0.35** 0.34 0.11 0.02
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (3.85)
Husband's Age -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.50**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.25)
Wife's Age 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04* 0.02 0.06** -0.04 0.09
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.23)
Total Household Land -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.13** -0.11** -0.04 -0.47*** 0.69
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.46)
0.01 0.04 0.10 0.58*** -0.52*** 0.06 0.37 6.37***
(0.26) (0.23) (0.27) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.53) (1.64)
Observations 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,933
R-squared 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Total female land/ Total 
Hh land
Table 9. Women Likely Inherited Under the Succession Law
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Likely Inherited After Law Passed Sample
(1) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.35*** -0.31*** -0.12 -1.10*** 0.02 -1.11*** 1.32*** -7.53***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.40) (1.65)
Log of family size 2.33*** 2.74*** 1.62*** -3.06*** -0.53 3.22*** 4.62** -9.42*
(0.55) (0.63) (0.42) (0.71) (0.77) (0.60) (2.31) (5.69)
Husband School 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.35 -2.43** -10.99*
(0.24) (0.28) (0.19) (0.35) (0.30) (0.25) (0.98) (6.20)
Wife School 0.27 0.15 0.28 -0.29 -0.44 0.37 0.05 4.57
(0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.33) (0.31) (0.23) (0.79) (6.01)
Husband's Age 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.05* -0.09 0.50
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.48)
Wife's Age 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.16 0.40
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) (0.57)
Total Household Land -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.16* -0.11* -0.08 -0.45*** 0.48
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.35)
0.60 0.65 0.33 1.27* -0.61 -0.35 1.85 8.57
(0.39) (0.44) (0.31) (0.73) (0.60) (0.46) (1.52) (5.66)
Observations 4,161 4,161 4,161 4,161 4,161 4,161 4,161 4,161
R-squared 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Female Inherited Land /  
Total Household Land
Table 10. Female Inherited Land over Male Inherited Land
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Female Inherited Land over Male Inherited Land - Landowners
(1) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.09 0.05 -0.02 -1.01*** -0.11 -1.45*** 0.49 -15.66***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.31) (1.73)
Log of family size 6.14*** 5.73*** 4.07*** -1.09* -0.47 2.16*** 1.84 5.07
(0.98) (1.06) (0.94) (0.65) (0.60) (0.69) (1.46) (9.52)
Husband School 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.40 -0.07 0.12 -1.92*** -4.32
(0.30) (0.33) (0.29) (0.27) (0.23) (0.28) (0.65) (4.63)
Wife School 0.47* 0.16 0.40 -0.76*** -0.24 0.01 0.18 7.08
(0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.53) (4.62)
Husband's Age -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.46)
Wife's Age 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.08*** 0.04 0.10*** -0.02 -0.48
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.40)
Total Household Land -0.05 -0.00 -0.07 -0.09* -0.06 0.05 -0.37*** -0.17**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.08)
-0.67 -0.25 -0.42 -0.10 -0.75*** -0.16 1.62* -133.29***
(0.76) (0.58) (0.66) (0.30) (0.28) (0.49) (0.84) (40.22)
Observations 5,255 5,255 5,255 5,255 5,255 5,255 5,255 5,255
R-squared 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Female Inherited Land/ 
Male Inherited Land
Table 11. Female Inherited Land over Total Inherited Land
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Female Inherited Land over Total Inherited Land - Landowners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.14 0.05 -0.09 -1.06*** -0.02 -1.47*** 0.53* -15.01***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.31) (1.53)
Log of family size 6.14*** 5.49*** 4.32*** -1.27** -0.16 2.22*** 1.31 10.51*
(0.86) (0.93) (0.83) (0.63) (0.57) (0.65) (1.34) (5.66)
Husband School 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.28 -0.04 0.11 -2.00*** -1.56
(0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.22) (0.26) (0.60) (4.43)
Wife School 0.52** 0.26 0.38 -0.66*** -0.27 0.19 0.26 3.90
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.25) (0.49) (3.73)
Husband's Age -0.05* -0.05* 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.39
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.36)
Wife's Age 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.07** 0.03 0.09*** -0.04 -0.23
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.27)
Total Household Land -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.09** -0.08** 0.05 -0.39*** -0.19***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.07)
-0.03 -0.11 0.22 0.62** -0.79*** 0.13 -0.37 -11.45***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.27) (0.31) (0.64) (2.76)
Observations 6,023 6,023 6,023 6,023 6,023 6,023 6,023 6,023
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Female Inherited Land/ 
Total Inherited Land
Table 12. All Male Land over Total Household Land
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All Male Land over Household Land - Landowners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.20** -0.05 -0.09 -1.17*** -0.04 -1.52*** 1.37*** -8.66***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.28) (0.85)
Log of family size 5.13*** 4.59*** 3.82*** -1.60*** -0.09 2.89*** 1.29 -1.26
(0.65) (0.67) (0.66) (0.48) (0.45) (0.53) (1.21) (3.18)
Husband School 0.30 0.21 0.34 0.08 0.02 0.11 -1.78*** -4.05
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.51) (2.96)
Wife School 0.35 0.21 0.19 -0.50** -0.37** 0.37 0.07 -2.16
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (3.10)
Husband's Age -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.21)
Wife's Age 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.04* 0.01 0.05** -0.05 0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.18)
Total Household Land -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.14*** -0.12** -0.03 -0.49*** 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.17)
Male land/ Total hh land 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.59*** 0.62*** -0.19 0.07 9.14***
(0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25) (0.55) (1.52)
Observations 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524
R-squared 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Table 13. Male Inherited Land over Total Household Land
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Male Inherited Land over Household Land - Landowners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.20** -0.06 -0.09 -1.13*** -0.01 -1.51*** 1.40*** -8.35***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29) (0.84)
Log of family size 5.11*** 4.57*** 3.84*** -1.47*** -0.05 2.91*** 1.36 -2.06
(0.64) (0.67) (0.66) (0.49) (0.45) (0.52) (1.21) (3.07)
Husband School 0.30 0.21 0.34 0.07 -0.00 0.11 -1.79*** -4.17
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.51) (2.98)
Wife School 0.35 0.20 0.20 -0.47** -0.35** 0.37 0.10 -0.12
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (3.10)
Husband's Age -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.21)
Wife's Age 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.05** 0.01 0.05** -0.05 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.18)
Total Household Land -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.15*** -0.11** -0.04 -0.49*** 0.18
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.20)
-0.05 -0.13 0.11 0.55** 0.94*** 0.06 0.66 13.83***
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.19) (0.26) (0.53) (2.46)
Observations 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524
R-squared 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Male inherited land / 
Total hh land
Table 14. Budget Shares Affected by “High Inheritance” Districts
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Budget Share Affected By 'High Inheritance' Districts
(1) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
Log of per capita expenditures 0.03 0.10 0.12 -1.21*** -0.12 -1.50*** 1.31*** 9.27***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.26) (0.91)
Log of family size 5.27*** 4.66*** 3.95*** -1.50*** -0.32 2.71*** 1.19 11.43**
(0.65) (0.66) (0.67) (0.49) (0.44) (0.53) (1.20) (5.66)
Husband School 0.24 0.17 0.27 0.09 0.06 0.12 -1.77*** -3.32
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.51) (3.21)
Wife School 0.37* 0.27 0.16 -0.55*** -0.40** 0.30 0.28 12.19***
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (3.11)
Husband's Age -0.01 -0.02 0.04* 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.75***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.28)
Wife's Age 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 0.06** -0.05 -0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.31)
Total Household Land -0.08 -0.00 -0.11* -0.14*** -0.10** -0.01 -0.44*** -0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.83)
High Inheritance District? 1.45*** 1.20*** 0.93*** -0.16 0.18 -1.14*** 1.38*** -264.18
(0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.19) (0.24) (0.53) (0.00)
Observations 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524
R-squared 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15. 2 Stage Least Squares Estimation using “High Inheritance” Districts as Instrument
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IV - Budget Share Affected By 'High Inheritance' Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
-0.17*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -1.24*** -0.09 -1.70*** 1.56*** -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.31) (0.08)
Log of family size 0.91*** 0.54*** 0.37* -1.40*** -0.42 3.36*** 0.40 0.12
(0.28) (0.16) (0.20) (0.52) (0.46) (0.65) (1.34) (0.47)
Husband School 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 -0.07 -1.53*** -0.43*
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18) (0.27) (0.55) (0.24)
Wife School 0.22** 0.16** 0.06 -0.55*** -0.40** 0.28 0.31 0.26
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.20) (0.18) (0.26) (0.47) (0.18)
Husband's Age 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Wife's Age 0.02* 0.02** 0.00 -0.05** 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Total Household Land 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.15*** -0.09** -0.07 -0.36*** 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08)
3.80* 2.71* 1.09 -2.61 2.94 -18.69*** 22.75** -14.77***
(2.06) (1.55) (1.27) (3.87) (3.22) (4.73) (9.37) (2.56)
Observations 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Female Inherited Land /  
Total Household Land
Table 16. “High Knowledge” Districts Prediction of Land Inheritance
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Affects of 'High KNowledge' Districts on Female Land Inheritance
(1) (2)
Probit OLS
VARIABLES Inherited Land Yes/No Size of Inherited Parcels
High Knowledge District? 0.13** 0.01
(0.07) (0.01)
Log of per capita expenditures -0.06* 0.00
(0.03) (0.00)
Log of family size 0.12 0.02**
(0.09) (0.01)
Husband School -0.04 0.01
(0.09) (0.01)
Wife School 0.00 -0.01
(0.08) (0.01)
Husband's Age 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Wife's Age 0.01 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00)




Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 17. 2 Stage Least Squares Estimation using “High Knowledge” Districts as Instrument
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IV - Budget Share Affected By 'High Knowledge' Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female Male Female Male Child Household
VARIABLES School School School Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
6.57 1.01 5.56 -48.21 -41.45* 33.86 51.13 82.08*
(7.19) (3.55) (5.72) (29.93) (24.08) (27.02) (41.52) (46.67)
-0.09 -0.10* 0.01 -2.00*** -0.74** -1.04*** 1.93*** 1.25*
(0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.41) (0.35) (0.32) (0.66) (0.64)
Log of family size 0.62 0.55** 0.07 0.35 0.95 1.34 -0.74 -4.41
(0.54) (0.26) (0.44) (1.98) (1.59) (1.57) (2.80) (2.95)
Husband School 0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.49 0.75 -0.84 0.10
(0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.75) (0.62) (0.66) (0.97) (1.18)
Wife School 0.24 0.17* 0.08 -0.46 -0.61 0.21 -0.11 0.96
(0.17) (0.09) (0.13) (0.68) (0.56) (0.61) (0.89) (1.07)
Husband's Age -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11)
Wife's Age 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.10* 0.01 0.09
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10)
Total Household Land -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.27* -0.16 0.05 -0.30 0.36
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.21) (0.23)
Observations 4,251 4,251 4,251 4,251 4,251 4,251 4,251 4,251
R-squared 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Female Inherited Land /  
Total Household Land
Log of per capita 
expenditures
Full Chart of Figure 2.
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